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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JACK V.WILKINSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20000941-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for possession or use of 
methamphetamine, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 
(1998).1 This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to support 
defendant's conviction for possession or use of methamphetamine. 
Standard of Review. This Court affords great deference to the jury verdict. State v. 
Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994). Accordingly, the appellate court reviews the 
defendant was also convicted of two class B misdemeanor offenses—possession 
or use of marijuana, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998), and 
unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(a) 
(1998). See R. 122-23. However, he does not challenge those convictions on appeal. 
Aplt. Brf. at 7. 
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evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury 
verdict. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1212 (Utah 1993). The Court will not reverse a jury ( 
conviction for insufficiency of the evidence unless "the evidence is so lacking and 
insubstantial that reasonable [minds] could not possibly have reached a verdict beyond a < 
reasonable doubt." State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES 
I 
The interpretation of constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules is not relevant to a 
determination of this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .' 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Defendant was charged by information with possession or use of methamphetamine, 
a third degree felony, possession or use of marijuana, a class B misdemeanor, and unlawful 
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. R. 1-2. More than a year after 
defendant was formally charged, he was bound over for trial on all three counts. R. 64-65. 
Defendant, who failed to appear at trial, was tried in absentia and convicted of all three 
counts as charged. R. 90, 122-24; R. 260: 89-90. Thereafter, the court issued a bench < 
warrant for defendant's arrest. R. 125-26. 
After defendant's arrest on the bench warrant, he filed several post-trial motions. R. 
136-47. All of his motions were denied except his motion to remove counsel. SeeR. 148-
153. After the appointment of conflict counsel, defendant filed a motion to arrest judgment 
on grounds unrelated to this appeal. See R. 156-64. That motion was denied. R. 168-72. 
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Thereafter, the court ordered a competency evaluation on the petition of defendant. 173-75, 
184-89. Following the evaluation, the court found defendant competent to proceed. R. 193. 
Defendant then moved to recuse the judge, but that motion too was denied. R. 196-99,205-
07; see also R. 232-34. 
Defendant filed another motion to arrest judgment, alleging that the evidence was 
insufficient as a matter of law. R. 212-17. The court denied the motion. R. 227.2 The trial 
court subsequently sentenced defendant to an indeterminate prison term of not more than five 
years for possession or use of methamphetamine and to concurrent jail terms of 180 days for 
each misdemeanor conviction. R. 241-42. Defendant timely appealed. R. 244-45. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
On August 1,1998, defendant spent the day with his friend Stephen Bullock. See R. 
260:40,42,44. At least part of the day was spent at Bullock's parents' home in Orem where 
defendant helped his friend repair his truck. See R. 260: 40. The two also used drugs 
together that day, smoking marijuana and injecting methamphetamine. R. 260: 42, 44, 58. 
At some point that day, the two left the Orem residence in Bullock's truck. R. 260: 
39-40. Near midnight, the friends drove from Pleasant Grove towards American Fork. See 
R. 260: 39-40, 55. Driving behind the two in his patrol car was Deputy Owen Shiverdecker 
of the Utah County Sheriffs Department. R. 260: 55. When Deputy Shiverdecker attempted 
to pass the truck, Bullock swerved into the other lane forcing Deputy Shiverdecker to slow 
2The trial court's Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment is reproduced 
in Addendum A. 
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down behind him. R. 260: 55. Once again behind the truck, Deputy Shiverdecker observed 
Bullock again cross the traffic lines. SeeR. 260: 55. 
Deputy Shiverdecker activated his overhead lights to stop the truck. R. 260: 40, 55. 
Before the deputy approached the vehicle, defendant placed the assorted drugs and 
paraphernalia lying in the truck in a paper sack and hid them under the bench seat. R. 260: 
41,44. Deputy Shiverdecker walked up to the driver's door and spoke with Bullock. R. 260: 
55. In the meantime, Deputy James Bingham, who had driven to the scene as backup, 
walked up to the passenger door of the truck where defendant was seated and stood there. 
R. 260: 48, 57. 
While speaking with Bullock, Deputy Shiverdecker noticed that Bullock appeared 
exceptionally relaxed. See R. 260: 55-56. He did not respond promptly to the deputy's 
questions, his speech was somewhat slurred, and he was not otherwise very alert. R. 260: 
55-56. Deputy Shiverdecker also noticed that defendant was slumped over, leaning against 
the side of the car, with his head bobbing forward. R. 260: 56. Defendant appeared to be in 
worse condition than Bullock. R. 260: 56. These characteristics were symptomatic of not 
only alcohol or heroin use, but also marijuana use or the latter stages of methamphetamine 
use. See R. 260: 53-54, 58, 67-68.3 
3Deputy Shiverdecker testified that methamphetamine initially elevates the level of 
activity in users for 12 to 24 hours, making them "very excited, very full of energy, 
uncontrollable energy even." R. 260: 54. He farther testified, however, that when user's 
are coming off a high on methamphetamine, "they generally do what's called 'crash.' 
They sleep, if they don't have access to more drugs, sleep a day, two days, three days." 
R. 260: 54. 
4 
When Deputy Shiverdecker shined his flashlight into the truck to determine if there 
was any evidence of alcohol consumption, he observed a syringe lying on the passenger side 
of the floorboard. R. 260: 56-57. Suspecting that Bullock was under the influence, Deputy 
Shiverdecker requested that Bullock submit to a series of field sobriety tests, which he failed. 
R. 260: 55. Bullock also admitted to having used drugs that day. R. 260: 40-41. Deputy 
Shiverdecker handcuffed Bullock and placed him under arrest. R. 260: 57. 
After arresting Bullock, Deputy Shiverdecker walked to the passenger side of the car 
and asked defendant to exit the truck. R. 260: 48,57. Before doing so, defendant kicked the 
syringe and a metal spoon out onto the ground. R. 260: 57, 67. Deputy Shiverdecker again 
asked defendant to exit the truck. R. 260: 57. As he did so, defendant reached down, picked 
up the syringe, and tossed it back into the truck in an apparent attempt to hide it. R. 260: 57-
58, 63, 68. 
Deputy Shiverdecker, who knew defendant, observed that defendant "didn't seem 
himself—his speech was "very, very slurred" and he "seemed very out of it." R. 260: 58. 
He also observed a recent track mark on defendant's left arm. R. 260: 72-74. Suspecting 
that defendant was high on drugs, the officers handcuffed him. R. 260: 48-49, 58. When 
defendant asked why he was being handcuffed, Deputy Shiverdecker explained that he 
believed him to be "too high to be out of handcuffs" R. 260: 58. Upon being so advised, 
defendant "said he hadn't shot up since that morning." R. 260: 58. 
Deputy Shiverdecker then searched defendant's person, finding identification not 
belonging to him and a capped syringe in his back pants pocket. R. 260: 58-59,63,70. After 
5 
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Deputy Shiverdecker's search of defendant, Deputy Bingham escorted him to his patrol car. 
R. 260: 48-49, 58-59. Although Deputy Bingham did not smell any particular odor coming 
from defendant's person, he noticed that defendant's speech was "very slurred, his eyes were 
red, [and] his pupils were dilated." R. 260:49-50. After Deputy Bingham gave the Miranda < 
warning, defendant said that "he didn't know anything about anything." R. 260: 49, 71. He 
claimed he did not know where the drugs came from and asserted that they probably 
i 
belonged to Bullock. R. 260:49. Defendant thereafter invoked his right to remain silent and 
said nothing more. R. 260: 49. 
A search of Bullock's truck by Deputy Shiverdecker revealed a small baggy of 
methamphetamine on the center of the seat where defendant had been sitting. R. 260: 59,64, 
69. Deputy Shiverdecker also found underneath defendant's seat, near the center hump, a
 { 
white paper sack containing several capped syringes, a small baggy of marijuana, and a 
syringe which was a quarter full of a yellow substance appearing to be methamphetamine. 
R. 260: 59-62, 65, 69-71.4 Deputy Shiverdecker also recovered the spoon defendant had 
kicked onto the ground, which had a white cotton ball stuck to it with methamphetamine 
residue on that. R. 260: 60, 63-64, 66.5 ' 
4The liquid substance in the syringe was not tested due to its increased health 
hazard to lab technicians. R. 260: 71-72. 
5Methamphetamine is prepared for injection by placing the powder in a spoon or 
similar object and heating it with a butane torch or lighter until it liquefies. R. 260: 59-
60. Users then extract the liquid with a syringe after placing a small cotton ball in the 
liquid to remove some of the impurities. R. 260: 60. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The evidence introduced at trial is sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for 
possession or use of methamphetamine. In assessing the strength of the case, the Court must 
view the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence in a light most favorable 
to the verdict. When the driver was stopped, defendant, who was a passenger in the truck, 
was sitting on a baggy of methamphetamine. Before the deputy could approach, defendant 
tried to hide the drugs and paraphernalia lying in the truck by placing them in a paper sack 
and concealing them underneath his seat. Defendant admitted to injecting methamphetamine 
earlier that day. He had a syringe in his pants pocket. A spoon used for preparing 
methamphetamine was lying on the floor at his feet. All these circumstances and others 
demonstrated that defendant had possession of the methamphetamine, having both the power 
and intent to exercise control over the drug. The evidence also was sufficient to establish 
that defendant used methamphetamine that day. His admission that he used the drug that 
morning was corroborated by the recent track mark on his arm, the paraphernalia on his 
person and under his control, and his physical condition. 
ARGUMENT 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S 
CONVICTION FOR POSSESSION OR USE OF METHAMPHETAMINE 
On appeal, defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction 
for possession or use of methamphetamine. Aplt. Brf. at 7-12. The jury's verdict is afforded 
great deference. State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994). In reviewing a jury 
7 
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verdict on an insufficiency claim, the Court reviews the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1212 (Utah 1993); accord State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, If 18, 10 P.3d 346. The 
conviction will not be reversed unless "the evidence is so lacking and insubstantial that 
reasonable [minds] could not possibly have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt." 
State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229,231 (Utah 1980); accord Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1212 (holding that 
a conviction will not be reversed unless the evidence "is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the crime"); State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, ^  12,985 P.2d 911 
(holding that a conviction will be overturned only if "it is apparent that there is not sufficient 
competent evidence as to each element of the crime charged for the fact-finder to find, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the crime"). A review of the record 
here reveals that the evidence supported defendant's conviction. 
A. ESTABLISHING CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION. 
The Utah Controlled Substances Act makes it unlawful to "knowingly and 
intentionally [ ] possess or use a controlled substance." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 
(1998). "To prove that a defendant was in knowing and intentional possession of a 
controlled substance, the prosecution need only establish that the produced contraband was 
found in a place or under circumstances indicating that the accused had the ability and the 
intent to exercise dominion and control over it." State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 132 (Utah 
1987). "Actual physical possession presupposes knowing and intentional possession." State 
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v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 318 (Utah 1985). However, "[u]nlawfiil possession does not 
necessarily mean that the substance be found on the person of the accused or that he have 
sole and exclusive possession thereof." State v. Carlson, 635 P.2d 72, 74 (Utah 1981); 
accord Fox, 709 P.2d at 318-19. "A conviction may also be based on constructive 
possession." Fox, 709 P.2d at 319. 
To establish constructive possession, it is not enough to show that a defendant knew 
where drugs were located or even that he had access to those drugs. Id. at 320. The State 
must "prove that there was a sufficient nexus between the accused and the drug to permit an 
inference that the accused had both the power and the intent to exercise dominion and control 
over the drug." Id. at 319; accord Layman, 1999 UT 79, at % 15 (citing Fox); Hansen, 732 
P.2d at 132 (holding that "[tjhere must be some additional nexus between the accused and 
the contraband"). In other words, "evidence supporting the theory of 'constructive 
possession' must raise a reasonable inference that the defendant was engaged in a criminal 
enterprise and not simply a bystander." Fox, 709 P.2d at 320. 
Whether a sufficient nexus exists to establish constructive possession "is a highly fact-
sensitive determination." Layman, 1999 UT 79, atf 14. Appellate courts have considered 
various factors in determining whether a defendant has constructive possession of 
contraband. In Fox, the supreme court addressed whether a homeowner and his brother had 
constructive possession of nearly 3,000 mature marijuana plants grown at the home. Fox, 
709 P.2d 319-20. The State's high court considered as relevant factors: (1) "[o]wnership 
and/or occupancy of the premises upon which the drugs are found;"(2) "incriminating 
9 
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statements made by the accused;" (3) "incriminating behavior of the accused;" (4) "presence 
of drugs in a specific area over which the accused had control, such as a closet or drawer 
containing the accused's personal effects;" and (5) "presence of drug paraphernalia among 
the accused's personal effects or in a place over which the accused has special control." Id. 
(internal citations omitted). 
In State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386 (Utah App. 1991), the Court of Appeals addressed 
whether the driver of a car had constructive possession of drugs found in a package in the 
backseat where a passenger had been sitting. In addition to incriminating statements and 
behavior, relevant factors identified by the Court in Salas included (1) the sale or use of 
drugs, (2) the "proximity of defendant to [the] location of drugs," (3) "drugs in plain view," 
and (4) "drugs on defendant's person." Salas, 820 P.2d at 1388 (footnote omitted). 
In Layman, the Supreme Court cautioned against "mechanically relying on a list of 
factors, such as those set out in Fox and Salas, when applying" Fox's sufficient nexus test. 
Layman, 1999 UT 79, at f^ 15. The Court issued this caution because the factors identified 
in Fox and Salas "are not universally pertinent factors," but were instead "particularly 
relevant to the specific factual context in which those cases arose." Id. at ^ f 14. Nevertheless, 
the Layman court held that "[t]here is nothing wrong with a succeeding court considering 
factors that were considered relevant by an appellate court analyzing a factually-similar 
context." Id. at J 15. Thus, the factors identified in Fox and Salas "might be of help in 
guiding a finder of fact [in a similar case] in determining whether there was constructive 
possession." Id. at f^ 14. Courts may consider those factors as "relevant considerations in 
10 
making the underlying determination," while remaining mindful that the list is not 
exhaustive. Id. at ^ 15. 
B. THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTED A JURY FINDING THAT DEFENDANT POSSESSED 
METHAMPHETAMINE, HAVING BOTH THE POWER AND THE INTENT TO EXERCISE 
CONTROL OVER IT. 
As is the case here, the Fox and Salas courts addressed constructive possession under 
circumstances where the defendant occupied with others a place where contraband was 
found. Accordingly, the factors considered in Fox and Salas are also relevant here in 
determining whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant had constructive 
possession of the methamphetamine. See id. at f^ 15 (observing that courts may consider 
factors considered in other decisions where factually similar).6 Those factors and others 
support the conviction. 
Proximity of the Drugs. The evidence was uncontradicted that defendant was present 
in the truck where the methamphetamine was discovered. R. 260: 39-40, 59, 64, 69. 
Although he was not the owner or the driver of the truck, he had apparently been sitting on 
drugs, sitting on the very seat where the methamphetamine was found. R. 260: 59, 64, 69; 
6Defendant argues that this case "is really Layman in reverse." Aplt. Brf. at 10. 
However, other than Layman's reiteration of the Fox "sufficient nexus" test, it offers little 
assistance here. As noted by the Supreme Court, Layman was "not a house or car case." 
Layman, 1999 UT 79, at f 16. Instead, Layman addressed "whether [the defendant] had 
sufficient control over another person to prove constructive possession of something that 
person had in her physical possession." Id. (emphasis added). The Layman court 
reversed the defendant's conviction because "there was little evidence to prove that [the 
defendant] had such control over [a woman passenger] that one could reasonably infer 
beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly and intentionally possessed the drugs and 
paraphernalia in her [waist] pouch." Id. Whether defendant had any control over another 
person is not an issue here. 
11 
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see Salas, 820 P.2d at 1388 (holding that the "proximity of defendant to location of drugs" 
is a relevant factor). He thus had better access to the spot where the methamphetamine was ( 
found than did Bullock, who was driving. See Salas, 820 P.2d at 1389 (weighing as a factor 
against a finding of possession by the driver the fact that a passenger had better access to the 
cocaine in the vehicle than did the driver). Clearly, "[t]he mere presence of the defendant 
in an automobile in which illicit drugs are found does not, without more, constitute sufficient 
1 
proof of his possession of such drugs." Salas, 820 P.2d at 1388 (internal quotes omitted). 
Nevertheless, it is an "important factor," Fox, 709 P.2d at 319, and there was much more 
evidence establishing constructive possession. < 
Incriminating Behavior. Defendant's behavior was highly incriminating and 
supported an inference that he intentionally exercised dominion and control over the 
methamphetamine. Before Deputy Shiverdecker walked up to the two men, defendant tried 
to hide the drugs and paraphernalia lying in the truck by gathering them into a paper sack and 
i 
concealing them under the seat. R. 260: 41,44. However, his attempt to put everything in 
the paper sack was not entirely successful. A spoon used to prepare methamphetamine for 
injection remained on the floor, as did a syringe. R. 260: 56-57, 60, 63-64, 66-67. Before < 
-.. exiting the truck, defendant kicked the spoon and syringe out of the truck onto the ground. 
R. 260: 57,67-68. While these actions could have been accidental, they certainly support an 
inference that defendant was trying to conceal them from the deputies. This Court must 
assume that the jury drew that inference supporting the verdict. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1213 
(holding that "in reviewing a jury verdict [the Court] assume[s] that the jury believed the 
12 
evidence supporting the verdict"); Goddard, 871 P.2d at 544 (holding that an appellate court 
is obligated to uphold any "fair inferences" drawn by the jury as long as they are not 
speculative). Certainly, it was no accident that as defendant exited the truck, he picked up 
the syringe and put it back in the truck in an apparent attempt to hide it from the officers. See 
R. 260: 57-58, 63, 68. 
The baggy of methamphetamine also did not make it into the paper sack, but rested 
on the center of the seat where defendant had been sitting. R. 260: 59, 64, 69. Given 
defendant's attempts to hide the other drugs and paraphernalia, the jury could reasonably 
infer that defendant had also tried to conceal the methamphetamine by sitting on it. 
Defendant thus not only demonstrated power and dominion over the methamphetamine, but 
also exhibited a consciousness of guilt. 
Presence of Paraphernalia. In addition to finding the spoon that defendant had 
kicked outside the truck, the deputies found the partially loaded syringe that defendant had 
hidden in the paper sack. R. 260: 41,44, 59-62, 65, 69-71. The yellow liquid in the syringe 
was consistent with methamphetamine. R. 260: 59-60,65. Moreover, Deputy Shiverdecker 
found a capped syringe in defendant's pants pocket. R. 260: 58-59, 63, 70. Thus, the tools 
for preparing methamphetamine were present in the truck and on defendant's person: the 
baggy of methamphetamine lying on defendant's seat, the spoon and cotton ball for heating 
and purification which defendant kicked out of the truck, and the syringes, including the one 
found in defendant's own pocket. See R. 260: 59-60. The jury could thus reasonably infer 
13 
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that defendant not only had the power to exercise dominion and control over the 
methamphetamine, but also the intent to exercise control over it. See Fox, 709 P.2d at 319. 
Incriminating Statements. That defendant had the power and intent to exercise 
control over the methamphetamine was further buttressed by his admission to having injected 
drugs that very morning. When Deputy Shiverdecker explained that he was handcuffing 
defendant because he was "too high to be out of handcuffs," defendant protested, declaring 
that he had not "shot up since that morning." R. 260: 58. This admission was consistent with 
Bullock's testimony that the two had used methamphetamine and marijuana that day. R. 260: 
40-42, 44, 58. Whereas the two had used drugs together that day, the jury reasonably 
inferred that they were sharing the drugs—despite any claim that the marijuana belonged to 
defendant and the methamphetamine belonged to Bullock. See R. 260:41. Moreover, while 
Bullock surmised that the methamphetamine was probably his because it was in his truck, 
he also testified that he was not sure he even knew it was there. R. 260: 41, 43. He thus 
testified, "But I'm not exactly - where they found it in there, I'm not exactly sure it was mine 
or someone else had left it there or whatever." R. 260: 43. 
Indicia of Impairment or Use. Another relevant factor, not addressed in Fox or 
Salas, was defendant's physical condition. Deputy Shiverdecker testified that defendant 
"didn't seem himself." R. 260: 58. He testified that he first observed defendant slumped 
over against the side of the truck with his head bobbing forward. R. 260: 56. His speech was 
"very, very slurred." R. 260: 49, 58. His eyes were red and his pupils dilated. R. 260: 49. 
As described by Deputy Shiverdecker, defendant "seemed very out of it" and in worse 
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condition than Bullock. R. 260: 56, 58. Bullock in fact confirmed Deputy Shiverdecker's 
observations, testifying that defendant "was really out of it because he was tired." R. 260: 
44. The recent "track mark" on defendant's left arm further supported the inference 
defendant had recently been using methamphetamine. See R. 260: 72-74. Defendant's 
condition was thus consistent with "coming down off methamphetamine. See R. 260: 42, 
54. The jury could therefore reasonably infer that defendant had used methamphetamine that 
day and that he intended to exercise control over the methamphetamine he had been sitting 
on. 
In sum, the evidence introduced at trial established that "a sufficient nexus" existed 
between defendant and the methamphetamine found in the truck "to permit an inference that 
[defendant] had both the power and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the 
drug." Fox, 709 P.2d at 319; accord Layman, 1999 UT 79, at Tf 15. The evidence supports 
the inference that defendant was not only aware of the drugs, but was actually "engaged in 
a criminal enterprise and not simply a bystander." Fox, 709 P.2d at 320; see also Salas, 820 
P.2d at 1388 (holding that "suspicious or incriminating behavior" is a relevant factor). 
C. THE EVIDENCE ALSO SUPPORTED A JURY FINDING THAT DEFENDANT "USED" 
METHAMPHETAMINE. 
The evidence also supported a finding that defendant used methamphetamine that day. 
The statute not only prohibits the possession of methamphetamine, but also the "use" of 
methamphetamine. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i). Defendant suggests that the 
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evidence was insufficient to show that he used methamphetamine because neither deputy 
observed him doing so. See Aplt. Brf. at 8 (stating, "Nor did law enforcement personnel 
observe [defendant] actually use methamphetamine"). Direct observation by law 
enforcement officials is not a prerequisite to a sustainable conviction. Cf. State v. Starks, 627 
P.2d 88,92 (Utah 1981) (observing that "[t]he prosecutor's burden,... whether the evidence 
be direct or circumstantial, or a combination thereof, is to prove all elements of the crime 
charged beyond a reasonable doubt"). 
When Deputy Shiverdecker explained to defendant that he was "too high to be out of 
handcuffs," defendant admitted to having "shot up" that morning. See R. 260: 58 (declaring 
that he had not "shot up since that morning"). Evidence corroborating his use of 
methamphetamine that day was extensive. The deputy observed a recent "track mark" on 
defendant's left arm. R. 260: 72-74. Bullock testified that he and defendant were "coming 
down off methamphetamine use from earlier that day and defendant's physical 
characteristics—slumped over position, bobbing head, and slurred speech—were indeed 
consistent with the later stages of methamphetamine use. See R. 260: 42,49-50, 53-54, 56, 
58,67-68. 
Moreover, methamphetamine was found on the center of the seat where defendant had 
been sitting. R. 260: 59, 64, 69. The deputy recovered the spoon with a cotton ball stuck to 
it containing methamphetamine residue which defendant had kicked out of the truck. R. 260: 
60, 63-64, 66-67. A syringe partially filled with a yellow liquid consistent with 
methamphetamine was found in the paper sack underneath defendant's seat. R. 260:41,44, 
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59-62, 65, 69-71. And significantly, another syringe was found in defendant's own pants 
pocket. R. 260: 58-59, 63, 70. 
The foregoing evidence, when considered as a whole, was more than sufficient to 
establish that defendant had "used" methamphetamine that day. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's conviction. 
Respectfully submitted this fry day of August, 2001. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
^EJFREY S. GRAY ~^ 
-^A'SSISTANT ATTORNEY GENE; ASSIS   RAL 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH — 
C J / I I M ^ DeDutv 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JACK VIRGIL WILKINSON, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO ARREST JUDGEMENT 
CASE NO. 981405492 
DATE: May 25,2000 
JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING 
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder 
LAW CLERK: Gunda Jarvis 
The Court has reviewed Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment and the facts of the case. Based on the 
facts, a jury could easily have found actual, physical possession of the drugs, as well as constructive possession. 
Numerous facts existed by which the jury could have determined that there was a sufficient nexus between the 
Defendant and the drugs to find him guilty, as set form in the jury instructions and precedent case State v. Fox. 709 
P.2d 316 (Utah 1985). These facts include but are not limited to the following: Defendant was found with a syringe 
at his feet in the vehicle; upon exiting the vehicle Defendant kicked the syringe and a spoon that tested positive for 
methamphetamine to the ground; Defendant attempted to recover the kicked syringe; upon arrest of the Defendant 
a used syringe was found in his pocket, which syringe Defendant admitted was his; and finally, the arresting officer 
found track marks on the Defendant's arms, in regard to which the Defendant told the officer that he had shot up 
earlier that day. 
This Court holds mat the facts presented to the jury were sufficient to show a strong nexus between the 
Defendant and the drugs he was convicted of possessing, and the Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment is hereby 
DENIED. 
DATED this 1-4 day of May, 2000. 
k , >F 'N , 
B Y T H E # ^ R | 
cc: Sherry Ragan, Deputy Utah County Attorney 
James Clark, Counsel for Defendant 
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